

# **A Joint Planning Group for the UEx: An Essential Element for Campaign Planning**

**A Monograph  
by  
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## Abstract

A Joint Planning Group for the UEx: An Essential Element for Campaign Planning by Major John V. Meyer, III, United States Army, 48 pages.

What capabilities are required for the Unit of Employment, X (UEX) to plan joint operational level campaigns and operations? The proposed UEx staff structure in the *Unit of Employment Operations, White Paper Version 3.5* does not appear to be optimally organized or resourced to be effective in planning operational level campaigns as a Joint Task Force Headquarters. The purpose of the monograph is study the fundamentals of campaign planning and make a recommendation on the additional organizational capabilities the UEx must have to be successful at the joint operational level of war.

The study examines the fundamentals of campaign planning in order to establish campaign planning challenges to analyze the capabilities of the UEx as described in its approved operating concept. The study then examines the structure and capabilities of the UEx and compares them against the campaign planning challenges to establish capability gaps between what is required to plan campaigns and what the UEx is capable of doing. Finally, the study addresses the outstanding capability gaps by recommending changes to the UEx staff structure.

The study recommends one area in which the UEx needs additional organizational planning capabilities--the creation of a standing Joint Planning Group with a permanent core of planners to provide an organizational foundation for campaign planning.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Illustrations .....	v
Tables .....	vi
INTRODUCTION .....	1
Background and Relevance .....	1
Organization, Methodology, and Criteria .....	3
Summary .....	5
CAMPAIGN PLANNING .....	6
Purpose of Campaign Planning .....	6
Types of Campaign Plans .....	7
Fundamentals of Campaign Planning .....	8
Role of Operational Art .....	11
The Functional Staff .....	12
The Joint Planning Group .....	14
Summary .....	16
UEX CAPABILITIES .....	18
Operating Context for the UEx .....	18
UEX Staff Structure .....	21
Functions and Capabilities of the UEx .....	24
Summary .....	25
ANALYSIS .....	26
Requirements versus Capabilities .....	27
Organizational Staff Realignment .....	30
Advantages and Disadvantages .....	31
The Joint Planning Group .....	32
Advantages and Disadvantages .....	33
Summary .....	35
CONCLUSION and RECOMMENDATION .....	37
Conclusion .....	37
Recommendation .....	39
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	41
Joint .....	41
Army .....	41
Books .....	42
Articles .....	42

## Illustrations

Figure	Page
Figure 1. UEy Staff Configuration .....	13
Figure 2. Joint Planning Group Composition .....	15
Figure 3. Notional Situation .....	19
Figure 4. Wiring Diagram of the UEx as a Joint Task Force Headquarters .....	21
Figure 5. UEx Structure.....	23
Figure 6. Joint Planning Group Planning Process .....	33

## Tables

Table	Page
1. Fundamentals of a Campaign Plan.....	9
2. UEx Campaign Planning Challenges.....	10
3. UEx Functions.....	24
4. UEx Campaign Planning Challenges.....	27
5. UEx Functions.....	27

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

What capabilities are required for the Unit of Employment, X (UEX) to plan joint operational level campaigns and operations as a Joint Task Force Headquarters? The UEX staff structure does not appear optimally organized or resourced to be effective in planning operational level campaigns as a Joint Task Force Headquarters. The purpose of the monograph is to study the fundamentals of campaign planning and determine if the UEX requires additional capabilities to be successful at the joint operational level of war. The study examines two potential areas for organizational change in order to increase the effectiveness of the UEX's planning capabilities. First, the study explores the idea of an organizational realignment of the UEX staff structure from a general staff to a functional staff model. Second, the study explores the value of the UEX creating a standing Joint Planning Group with a permanent core of planners to provide an organizational foundation for campaign planning.

### Background and Relevance

The U.S. Army is in the process of creating new units in order to operate more effectively in the emerging joint operational environment. The Unit of Employment (UE) is one of the organizations under development and consists of two echelons, the UEy and the UEX.

The UEy is the principal Army theater level headquarters that supports a regional combatant commander. The UEy only has assigned its organic headquarters personnel; the composition of its units depends on the mission requirements. The UEy combines the traditional functions and requirements of the corps level of headquarters and the Army Service Component Command into one level of command. The UEy is responsible for performing the Army Service Component Command functions for the Regional Combatant Command and for providing the



required Army support across an entire region. The UEy is also capable of becoming the Joint Force Land Component Command.<sup>1</sup>

The UEx is the next lower echelon of command. The UEx is the Army's principal warfighting headquarters, is modular in nature, and exercises operational control over Units of Action in tactical engagements. The UEx is not a fixed formation; units are assigned based on mission requirements. The UEx combines the traditional functions of a division with those of a corps. The UEx also has the capability to command other UExs as a land component command or to become a Joint Task Force Headquarters with the augmentation of a higher-ranking commander and additional staff packages.<sup>2</sup> The UEx operates at the operational level of war, and while there are pamphlets and emerging concepts on how this occurs, there appears to be less emphasis on the unique or UEx specific requirements to conduct joint operational level campaign planning.

The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker and the Acting Secretary of the Army, Mr. Les Brownlee describe the requirements for the new Units of Employment:

At division level and higher, headquarters will surrender organic subordinate formations, becoming themselves streamlined modular organizations capable of command and controlling any combination of capabilities—Army, joint, or coalition....

...Trained, cohesive staffs are key to combat effectiveness. Today, because our tactical headquarters elements lack the necessary joint interfaces, we have to improvise these when operations begin. That must change. Major tactical headquarters must be capable of conducting Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) operations. Major operation headquarters must have enough permanent sister-service staff positions to receive and employ a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) plug, enabling them with equal effectiveness to serve as an Army Service Component Command, Joint Task Force, or JFLCC headquarters.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, White Paper, *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2004), 14.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Les Brownlee and Peter J. Schoomaker, "Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities," *Parameters*, VOL XXXIV, no 2 (Summer 2004), 18.

The Unit of Employment White Paper lists seven required fundamentals<sup>4</sup> of the new UEs that apply to both the UEy and UEx. Two of these fundamentals directly address the purpose of this monograph.<sup>5</sup> The first is the requirement to “plan, prepare, execute, and assess full spectrum operations” and the second requirement is to be able to “execute operations using joint capabilities as an integrated joint force.”<sup>6</sup> The UEx must be capable of planning operational campaigns in order to effectively operate in the emerging joint operational environment.

The issue of a UEx’s joint planning capability is relevant to the U.S. Army because in the near future, UExs may be planning and conducting operations at the operational level of war. The Army is currently fighting two simultaneous wars while trying to implement the changes and requirements outlined by the senior Army leadership. With the assumption that the Army’s commitments in the foreseeable future are going to remain at the current level, if not increase, then the likelihood that the new UExs may find themselves deployed in the near future is high. The combination of the requirements to fight two wars, with the demands of the joint operational environment, may result in the UExs operating as a Joint Task Force Headquarters with the appropriate Standing Joint Force Headquarters plugs. Therefore, UExs may be planning operational campaigns.

## **Organization, Methodology, and Criteria**

Following this introduction chapter, the monograph is organized into four chapters: campaign planning, UEx capabilities, analysis, and the conclusion and recommendation. The

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<sup>4</sup> *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5.*, 18. The seven fundamentals of the UE are: plan, prepare, execute, and assess full spectrum operations; provide tailored, modular, and responsive Army forces to the joint force commander; generate decision superiority through information superiority; seize, retain, and exploit the initiative; overwhelm the enemy at the decisive place and time; execute operations using Joint capabilities as an integrated Joint force; and generate and sustain combat power for the duration of the campaign.

<sup>5</sup> The monograph focuses on a UEx acting as a Joint Task Force Headquarters planning an operational campaign. The remaining five fundamentals concern the execution of the campaign and are not as relevant to the monograph.

<sup>6</sup> *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5.*, 18.

monograph begins by examining the purpose of campaign planning and reviews the four types of campaign plans. The campaign planning chapter then examines two areas in order to develop the UEx campaign planning challenges. First, what are the essential elements of campaign planning and which are relevant to the UEx planning operational level campaigns? The examination of this question provides the doctrinal requirements to analyze current UEx capabilities. Second, what is the role of operational art in campaign planning and how is it relevant to the UEx planning campaigns? In the process of answering these questions, the study develops the baseline UEx campaign planning challenges. Finally, this chapter examines the functional organization structure of the UEy and the requirement for the creation of a Joint Planning Group as examples of organizations with the structure and resources to plan campaigns.

With the UEx campaign planning challenges established, the study examines the operational framework, staff roles, and functions of the UEx. This chapter begins by describing, in the form of a vignette, the mission and the future joint operational environment in which the UEx operates. In this vignette, the UEx is a Joint Task Force Headquarters for a small-scale contingency operation.<sup>7</sup> The UEx deploys to a foreign country as a Joint Task Force Headquarters with the task to conduct Foreign Internal Defense. Concurrently, the Joint Force Commander tasks the UEx to develop a subordinate campaign plan to achieve the theater campaign objectives. The chapter then examines the staff roles and functions of the UEx to establish the UEx's capabilities. These capabilities form part of the analysis in the following chapter.

The analysis chapter identifies gaps between the capabilities necessary to conduct joint operational level campaign planning with the planning capabilities of the UEx. The capability gaps form the basis for developing organizational recommendations to enable the UEx to plan

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<sup>7</sup> FM 3-71, *Division Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, (Washington, D.C., 2002), F-1 defines a small scale contingency as any military operation short of a major theater war. It includes foreign humanitarian assistance, peace operations, non-combatant evacuations, enforcing sanctions, reinforcing key allies, and limited strikes and interventions.

operational campaigns. The analysis continues by examining two potential organizational changes to increase the effectiveness of the UEx. First, the chapter explores the idea of an organizational realignment of the UEx from a general staff to a functional staff model. Second, the chapter explores the value of creating a standing Joint Planning Group with a permanent core of planners to provide an organizational foundation for campaign planning. Finally, the last chapter summarizes the monograph and makes a recommendation to improve the effectiveness of the UEx planning operational campaigns as a Joint Task Force Headquarters.

The monograph uses a combination of emerging concepts and approved doctrine to develop the analysis and recommendations. In some instances, doctrine has not caught up with the UE's concepts and pamphlets. For example, corps and divisions are changing to the new UE configuration but still using FM 100-15 *Corps Operations* and FM 3-71 *Division Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* respectively. Therefore, the study uses doctrine to develop the requirements for UEx campaign planning and the emerging UE concepts to establish required capabilities.

## **Summary**

This monograph focuses on the capabilities and limitations of a UEx operating as a Joint Task Force Headquarters while conducting Foreign Internal Defense. The study examines the essential fundamentals of campaign planning and the role of operational art to develop UEx campaign planning challenges with which to assess the campaign planning capabilities of the UEx. Identified capability gaps form the basis of the organizational recommendations in the study in order to enable the UEx to plan operational campaigns in the joint operational environment.

## CHAPTER TWO

### CAMPAIGN PLANNING

Joint and Army doctrine recognize three levels of war. These levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. While both the strategic and tactical levels of war impact the UEx, the study focuses on the UEx at the operational level of war. It is at the operational level of war that the UEx develops campaign plans. The operational level of war is:

The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.<sup>8</sup>

The UEx in this study operates at the lower end of the operational level of war. As an operational headquarters, the UEx must be able to “link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.”

Campaign planning is the process that a headquarters uses at the operational level to accomplish strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. In order to develop the campaign planning challenges to analyze the capabilities of the UEx, this chapter reviews campaign planning, the role of operational art, and the concepts of a functional staff and a joint planning group.

#### Purpose of Campaign Planning

A military commander at the operational level develops a campaign plan to achieve objectives that lead to the attainment of the strategic objectives. The purpose of the campaign

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<sup>8</sup> The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations*, (Washington, D.C., 2002), GL-15.

plan is to plan, prepare, and execute campaigns to achieve strategic military objectives and provide the concept of operations needed to synchronize and integrate the actions necessary to accomplish a strategic objective by accomplishing a series of intermediate objectives within a given time and space.<sup>9</sup>

In the campaign plan, the Joint Task Force commander synchronizes and integrates the land, sea, special operations, space, and air components assigned to the Joint Task Force. The campaign plan directs the operations of the subordinate services and components with a goal of maximum joint effectiveness. The plan does not focus on the equal distribution of effort between forces or services, but on the integration of all joint forces in order to achieve the joint commander's purpose. Ultimately, the campaign plan "provides the concept of operations and sustainment—the what, where, and how of the joint force will affect the adversary or situation—in sufficient detail for the staff and subordinate and supporting commanders to understand what they must do without further instructions."<sup>10</sup> There are four different types of campaign plans a commander may be responsible for developing.

## **Types of Campaign Plans**

There are four types of campaign plans that cover the spectrum of operations from the strategic to operational level. Campaign plans at the strategic level identify the framework of operations to accomplish world wide strategic objectives. From this framework, each lower level campaign plan nests its objectives and concepts of operation to support the achievement of the next higher campaign plan's objectives. This study examines the campaign plans a UEx most likely may be responsible for planning--the subordinate campaign plan and the major operations plan.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations*, (Washington, D.C., 2002), IV-1.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., IV-2.

<sup>11</sup> The four types of campaign plans are: global campaign plan, theater campaign plan, subordinate campaign plan, and major operations plan. Of these four types of campaign plans, the global campaign

A subordinate campaign plan describes how a subordinate Joint Force Commander intends to accomplish, or contribute to the accomplishment of, strategic or operational objectives in support of a global or theater campaign. Subordinate Joint Force Commanders develop subordinate campaign plans if their assigned missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation. Subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategic and operational guidance and direction developed by the supported commander. Service and functional component commanders subordinate to the Joint Force Commander use the campaign plan's concept of operations to develop their major operations plan. The major operations plan directly supports the achievement of the Joint Force Commander's operational objectives.<sup>12</sup>

The UEx must be capable of planning subordinate campaign plans. When the UEx is designated as a Joint Task Force Headquarters subordinate to the Regional Combatant Commander, the UEx uses the subordinate campaign plan to nest its objectives at the operational level with the Regional Combatant Commander's theater and strategic objectives.

## **Fundamentals of Campaign Planning**

Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations* lists fourteen essential fundamentals of campaign planning that are common for the development of all campaign plans. These fundamentals serve as an outline of requirements for the operational headquarters as it develops campaign plans. Campaign plans must address these fundamentals in order to ensure the achievement of the operational objectives. These fundamentals serve as the doctrinal requirements to analyze the capabilities of the UEx to plan campaigns. These fundamentals are:

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plan and the theater campaign plan are outside of the scope and ability of the UEx. JP 5-0 *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, IV-2, defines a global campaign plan as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's concept on how to accomplish strategic objectives within multiple theaters of operation. A theater campaign plan describes how a supported geographic combatant commander intends to accomplish strategic or operational objectives within a theater of war. The UEx is not capable of developing either type of campaign plan.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

Table 1. Fundamentals of a Campaign Plan

<i>Provide strategic direction, operational focus, and major tasks, objectives, and concepts to subordinate and supporting commanders.</i>
<i>Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.</i>
<i>Incorporate the supported commander's strategic intent and operational focus.</i>
<i>Identify any forces or capabilities that the adversary has in the operational area.</i>
<i>Identify adversary strategic and operational centers of gravity and describe how the supported commander intends to defeat them.</i>
<i>Identify friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity and describe how the supported commander intends to protect them.</i>
<i>Organize subordinate forces and establish command relationships.</i>
<i>Serve as the basis for planning by subordinate and supporting commanders.</i>
<i>Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons as required and authorized by the President.</i>
Translate strategic guidance into operational direction for subordinate and supporting commanders
Provide concepts of operations and sustainment for accomplishing strategic and operational objectives
Synchronize and integrate air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, in combination with interagency and multinational forces, to achieve unit of effort
Sequence a series of related major joint operations in time, space, and purpose throughout the operational area
Clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination

Source: JP 5.0 *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, IV-4.

The fundamentals in italics represent elements the UEx is organized, trained, and manned with the appropriate expertise and doctrine to accomplish.<sup>13</sup> The accomplishment of these fundamentals is similar to the outputs of the Military Decision Making Process that Army division and corps staffs should be capable of performing.<sup>14</sup> Since division and corps staffs use the Military Decision Making Process as the doctrinal standard for planning operations, the study

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<sup>13</sup> The one fundamental in italics the UEx is not capable of accomplishing is to provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons. This fundamental is outside the scope of the type of a Joint Task Force Headquarters that a UEx is going to command and control.

<sup>14</sup> Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*, (Washington, D.C., 2002), 3-1 defines Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) as an analytical planning process that establishes techniques for analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing courses of action against criteria of success, and selecting the best course of action. MDMP consist of seven steps: Receipt of Mission; Mission Analysis; Course of Action (COA) Development; COA Analysis; COA Comparison; COA Approval; and Orders Production.



does not consider the first nine fundamentals in Table 1 as challenges for the UEx to plan campaigns. The observation that staffs at the division and corps level train the Military Decision Making Process does not guarantee the UEx can accomplish the first nine fundamentals in Table 1, but the UEx has a good start on achieving these fundamentals. The biggest challenge for the UEx is in accomplishing the remaining five fundamentals. These five fundamentals are orders of magnitude higher than what the UEx staff routinely accomplishes.

Therefore, there are five remaining fundamentals that challenge the UEx to be able to plan a subordinate campaign plan. These five fundamentals in Table 2 become the capability requirements the UEx should be able to perform to effectively plan campaigns.

Table 2. UEx Campaign Planning Challenges

Translate strategic guidance into operational direction for subordinate and supporting commanders.
Provide concepts of operations and sustainment for accomplishing strategic and operational objectives.
Synchronize and integrate air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, in combination with interagency and multinational forces, to achieve unit of effort.
Sequence a series of related major joint operations in time, space, and purpose throughout the operational area.
Clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination.

These fundamentals are significant because the UEx needs assistance to accomplish them effectively. These fundamentals are inherently joint in nature and are usually accomplished in staffs whose organization facilitates the creation of joint boards, centers, and cells. The current UEx staff organization is not effectively organized or resourced to facilitate the creation of these joint boards, centers, and cells in order to accomplish these fundamentals. In order to accomplish the fundamentals in Table 2, the UEx can be more effective if its staff organizes to provide the commander with the necessary information he needs to plan and conduct campaigns.

## Role of Operational Art

A commander translates national and strategic objectives into campaigns through the concept of operational art. Operational art is:

The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander's strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.<sup>15</sup>

The key portion of this definition for the monograph is the focus on the joint force commander. Before he can begin to give campaign planning guidance through the elements of operational design to his staff, he must understand how the campaign plan is going to achieve the strategic objectives of his higher commander's campaign. The commander does this by answering the following questions:

What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal (ends)? What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition (ways)? How should resources be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)? What are the likely costs or risks in performing that sequence of actions?<sup>16</sup>

The role of the staff is to assist the commander in answering the above questions. "All staff organizations and procedures exist to make the organization, analysis, and presentation of vast amounts of information management for the commander."<sup>17</sup> The staff organizes in such a manner to facilitate the accomplishment of its role. In the joint environment two ways that staffs organize to assist the commander are functionally and through the creation of a Joint Planning Group.

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<sup>15</sup> JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, GL 14.

<sup>16</sup> Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, (Washington, D.C., 2001), 2-5.

<sup>17</sup> Department of the Army, Field Manual 101-5, *Staff Organizations and Operations*, (Washington, D.C., 1997), 1-3.


## The Functional Staff

The UEy is an example of a functionally aligned staff that is organized and resourced to plan campaigns. To review, the UEy is the principal Army theater level headquarters that supports a regional combatant commander. The UEy only has assigned its organic headquarters personnel. The composition of its units depends on the mission requirements. The UEy combines the traditional functions and requirements of the corps level of headquarters and the Army Service Component Command into one level of command. The UEy is responsible for performing both the Army Service Component Command functions for the Regional Combatant Command and for providing the required Army support across an entire region. The UEy is also capable of becoming the Joint Forces Land Component Command.<sup>18</sup>

The UEy is organized functionally in order to facilitate the organization, analysis, and presentation of vast amounts of information to the commander. The functional staff organization facilitates the UEy's transition into a Joint Forces Land Component Command or Joint Task Force Headquarters. In this organizational structure (see Figure 1), the traditional general staff sections are integrated into the functional areas of Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance; Operational Maneuver/Tactical Movement; Operational Fires & Effects; Operational Protection; Operations Sustainment, and Operational Command and Control.

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<sup>18</sup> *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5*, 14.



**Figure 1. UEy Staff Configuration**

Source: *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5*, 63.

The functional staff enables the Joint Task Force Headquarters to receive the necessary Standing Joint Force Headquarters augmentation packages and the creation of joint boards, centers, and cells.<sup>19</sup> These joint boards, centers, and cells provide the commander with the

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<sup>19</sup> However, tension exists between higher and lower staff echelons. The staff structure does not facilitate the command and control of subordinate echelons, including the UEx as a Joint Task Force Headquarters. The UEx is organized along the general staff model and does not integrate easily with a functional staff even in conventional operations where the UEx is not a Joint Task Force Headquarters but subordinate to the UEy. In this study, the UEx is a Joint Task Force Headquarters and may be more effective if it transitions to a functional staff in order to command and control the forces assigned and conduct campaign planning. The transition from a general staff to a functional staff takes time, training, and resources. It may make sense if the UEx is organized from the beginning as a functional staff. However, once this transition occurs there is still an organizational tension between the UEx and subordinate Units of Action. This organizational tension is addressed in Chapter Four.

information necessary to make decisions about planning and conducting joint operational level campaigns. There are ten joint boards, centers, and cells designed to accomplish the fourteen essential fundamentals of campaign planning.<sup>20</sup> Of these ten different boards, centers, and cells the Joint Planning Group is the foundation of planning and conducting joint operational campaigns.

## The Joint Planning Group

A Joint Task Force Headquarters conducts two types of planning, deliberate and crisis action planning.<sup>21</sup> In the vignette in the next chapter, the Joint Task Force Headquarters forms as the result of the crisis between A-land and B-land and conducts campaign planning using crisis action planning.<sup>22</sup> Once a crisis occurs it is essential that the Joint Task Force Headquarters begins coordinated planning and the sharing of information immediately. The Joint Task Force Headquarters coordinates its activities with other military forces, civilian agencies, and members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community.<sup>23</sup> In order for the Joint Task Force Headquarters to conduct crisis action planning, it forms a Joint Planning Group.

The Joint Planning Group is an integrated staff planning cell with the purpose “to conduct crisis action planning, be the focal point for operations order development, perform future planning, and accomplish other tasks as directed.”<sup>24</sup> The Joint Planning Group is the hub of all

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<sup>20</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, *Standard Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters*, (Norfolk, Virginia 2004), Annex F. These ten cells are the: Joint Information Superiority Cell (JISC); Joint Collection Management Cell (JCMC); Joint Coordination Board (JCB); Joint Coordination Board Working Group (JCB W/G); Joint Fires Element Working Group (JFE W/G); Time Sensitive Targets (TST) cell; Logistics Coordination Board (LCB); Blue/Red Cell; Joint Planning Group (JPG); and the Joint Knowledge Management Center (JKMC).


<sup>21</sup> The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, (Washington, D.C., 1999), IX 4.

<sup>22</sup> JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations*, GL-9, defines CAP as the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planning activities associated with the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planning is based on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs

<sup>23</sup> JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, IX 6.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., IX 7.

planning activities within the Joint Task Force Headquarters. The core of the Joint Planning Group is the planning cell that consists of 10-12 personnel who are familiar with the crisis action planning process and Joint Operation Planning and Execution System products. From the core Joint Planning Group, other cells form to address specific functions. These cells may include an orders cell, an information management cell, a deployment cell, and an information operations cell. Joint Publication 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures* recommends the following Joint Planning Group composition.



**Figure 2. Joint Planning Group Composition**

Source: JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, IX-8.

In order to operate effectively, the Joint Planning Group has some other important characteristics. First, the representation to the Joint Planning Group should be a long-term assignment to provide continuity of focus and consistency of procedure. Second, these representatives should be authorized spokespersons for their sections, components, or organizations. Third, representatives from the supported combatant command augment the Joint Planning Group.<sup>25</sup>

Of these characteristics the two relevant to this portion of the study are the long term assignment of personnel to the Joint Planning Group and the creation of a permanent core of planners. Since the UEx is Joint Task Force Headquarters capable it should assign personnel to a standing Joint Planning Group in order to provide for long term continuity of focus and consistency of procedure. If the UEx has a standing Joint Planning Group, it does not have to recreate staff procedures and relationships every time the UEx is activated as a Joint Task Force Headquarters. The Joint Planning Group should also have a small core of staff personnel that have the expertise to plan operations. This core is also the basis for expanding the Joint Planning Group, upon Joint Task Force Headquarters activation, to its full membership as represented in Figure 2.

## **Summary**

This chapter identifies the fundamentals to plan campaigns and develops UEx campaign planning challenges to use in analyzing the capabilities of the UEx. The exploration begins with an examination of the purpose of campaign planning and reviews the four types of campaign plans. The chapter then examines two areas in order to develop the campaign planning requirements. First, what are the essential elements of campaign planning and which are relevant to the UEx planning operational level campaigns? The examination of this question provides the

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<sup>25</sup> JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, IX-7.

initial challenges with which to analyze UEx capabilities. Second, what is the role of operational art in campaign planning and is it relevant to the UEx planning joint campaigns? In the process of answering the above questions, the chapter develops UEx planning challenges to evaluate the capabilities of the UEx. Finally, the chapter examines the functional staff structure of the UEy and the role of the Joint Planning Group.



## CHAPTER THREE

### UEx CAPABILITIES

This chapter identifies and establishes the capabilities of the UEx. The chapter covers three areas: the UEx operational context, its organization, and its functions from the *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5* and the *Objective Force, Unit of Employment Concept*. These UEx capabilities, in combination with the UEx campaign planning requirements developed in the previous chapter, form the basis of comparison in Chapter Four to determine the campaign planning capability gaps.

#### Operating Context for the UEx

The vignette in the monograph modifies the scenario located in the *Unit of Employment White Paper, Version 3.5*. The vignette provides the scope of operations within which the UEx is going to operate in the future. More importantly, this vignette provides the approved framework for developing the employment concepts and capabilities of the UEx.<sup>26</sup> It is logical that any analysis of UEx capabilities uses the same vignette the force developers are using in creating the UEs.

The monograph vignette is a likely representation of the types of scenarios in the emerging joint operating environment. In the future, there are going to be numerous opportunities for the UEx to deploy as a Joint Task Force Headquarters.

In any future joint campaign—whether long or short, smaller scale contingency (SSC) or major combat operations (MCO)—the joint force commander will seek to accomplish the assigned mission to defeat the enemy and achieve lasting decision as rapid as possible....


...Linking operational campaigns to theater strategy, the joint force commander must take a holistic view of the conflict across time and space, through an end to end campaign analysis. The commander must establish early, sustained control of the air, land, sea, space, and information domains, and focus on those key elements of the enemy

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<sup>26</sup> The monograph vignette modifies the one in the *Unit of Employment Operations Version 3.5* by not introducing subordinate UExs to the Joint Task Force.

systemology—*critical capabilities, decisive points and centers of gravity*—against which to apply decisive combat power.<sup>27</sup>

The study scenario has two bordering countries “A-land” and “B-land” that are currently experiencing an increase in tension (see Figure 3).



**Figure 3. Notional Situation**

Source: *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5*, 104.

A military junta rules B-land and is supporting an insurgency within the territory of A-land in order to change the government of A-land. A-land is an ally of the United States and as a result, a UEx deploys to A-Land with the primary purpose to support Foreign Internal Defense missions

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<sup>27</sup> Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-92, *Objective Force, Unit of Employment Concept*, (Fort Monroe, Virginia, 2003), 11.


ongoing in A-land. The UEx receives the tasks to eliminate the insurgents within A-land and destroy forces and bases supporting the insurgency within B-land to a depth of 250 kilometers. To achieve these objectives, the Joint Force Commander tasks the UEx to be his Joint Task Force Headquarters and to develop a subordinate campaign plan to achieve the theater campaign objectives.<sup>28</sup>

The UEx upon activation as a Joint Task Force Headquarters receives a Lieutenant General as the commander and the appropriate Standing Joint Force Headquarters augmentation of personnel. The Joint Task Force Headquarters is assigned a mix of UAs, U.S.M.C., Air, Special Operations, and multi-national forces (see Figure 4).

Additionally, there is a UEy in theater serving as the Regional Combatant Commander's Army Service Component Command. As the Army Service Component Command the UEy is responsible for accomplishing the appropriate Title X functions for the Regional Combatant Commander and UEx. The UEy has an administrative control (ADCON) relationship with the UEx.

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<sup>28</sup> *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5*, 101-103.



**Figure 4. Wiring Diagram of the UEx as a Joint Task Force Headquarters**

Source: Modified diagram from *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5*, 79.

The UEx, acting as a Joint Task Force Headquarters at the operational level of war, must function in the joint operational environment and develop operational campaigns to achieve theater or strategic objectives. In order to do this, the UEx plans campaigns.

### **UEx Staff Structure**

The UEx is a headquarters tasked to be the Army's contribution at the operational level of war linking strategic and operational objectives to the tactical employment of Units of Action. "This linkage is particularly important for units of employment because they are the primary land power echelons focused on campaign objectives established by the Joint Force Commander and they will often carry out fundamental joint responsibilities as the Army Forces, Joint Forces Land

Component Command or, or Joint Task Force Headquarters.”<sup>29</sup> This section examines the UEx’s structure and capabilities.

To review, the UEx is the Army’s principal warfighting headquarters, is modular in nature, and exercises operational control over Units of Action in tactical engagements. The UEx is not a fixed formation; units are assigned based on mission requirements. The UEx combines the traditional functions of a division with those of a corps. The UEx is capable of either being a land component command or a Joint Task Force Headquarters with the augmentation of a higher-ranking commander and additional staff packages.<sup>30</sup>

How is the UEx organized? As of December 2004 there is no approved base Table of Organization and Equipment that outlines how the organization is structured, how many soldiers by pay grade and skill level are in it, and what type of equipment they have to perform their duties and functions. The divisions undergoing reorganization from the traditional division and brigade structures to the new UE and Units of Action structures are not identical. However, there are two documents that outline the structure for two types of UEs and the functions they are capable of performing.<sup>31</sup> These documents form the basis of the analysis of the structure and functions of a generic UEx with the UEx campaign planning requirements.

The first area of analysis is the structure of the UEx. This study focuses on the UEx headquarters and not the subordinate Units of Action it command and controls. The UEx headquarters is the only permanently assigned organization in the UEx. The subordinate Units of Action are assigned to the UEx based on mission requirements.

The UEx staff structure is organized as a traditional general staff with the exception that the special staff is organic to the UEx headquarters. The UEx also has a special troops battalion


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<sup>29</sup> *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5*, 14 .

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> These two documents are the TRADOC White Paper, *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5* dated 16 July 2004; and the approved TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-92, *Objective Force Unit of Employment Concept*, dated 2 June 2003.

that is permanently assigned and includes basic life support, maintenance, communications, and security.<sup>32</sup> The organizational wire diagram appears in Figure 5.



**Figure 5. UEx Structure**

Source: *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5*, 80.

With this type of staff structure, the UEx is organized, trained, and manned with the appropriate expertise and doctrine to accomplish the first nine fundamentals of campaign planning.<sup>33</sup> The accomplishment of these fundamentals is similar to the outputs of the Military Decision Making Process that Army division and corps staffs should be capable of performing. However, this type of staff structure does not facilitate the creation of the numerous joint boards,

<sup>32</sup> *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5*, 79.

<sup>33</sup> These fundamentals are located in Table 1.

centers, and cells which directly contribute to accomplishing the remaining five campaign planning challenges.

## Functions and Capabilities of the UEx

The *Objective Force, Unit of Employment Concept* list functions the UEx should be capable of performing without the augmentation of the Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters plug. These functions in Table 3 are the cornerstone of capabilities the UEx can perform in order to meet its operational requirements.

Table 3. UEx Functions

Assigns missions and operating areas to subordinate units and defines timelines for their operations.
Directs simultaneous, integrated battles that comprise major operations, leading to rapid achievement of operational and/or campaign objectives.
Allocates subordinate fires/effects, aviation, ISR, maneuver support, and maneuver sustainment forces to weight the current battle and posture for future operations.
Applies mission-tailored forces to shield engaged forces from enemy capabilities, isolates the battle space where required with fires and/or blocking forces, and prevents the enemy from reinforcing or resynchronization.
Primarily responsible for providing ground based elements to the joint counter-precision campaign.
Builds and maintains combat power and sustains the campaign.
Functions as the primary ISR integrator for Army forces.

Source: *Objective Force, Unit of Employment Concept*, 24.

These functions are what the UEx should be capable of accomplishing with its organizational staff structure in Figure 5. Therefore, these functions are used in the next chapter to assist in the identification of capability gaps between the UEx organization and functions and the campaign planning requirements.

## Summary

This chapter uses the *Unit of Employment Operations, Version 3.5* and the *Objective Force, Unit of Employment Concept* to identify and establish the capabilities of the UEx. The chapter explores the UEx operating context, the organization of the UEx staff, and the functions the UEx should be able to perform. In the operating context vignette, the UEx is operating as a Joint Task Force Headquarters and must develop a subordinate campaign plan. The UEx staff structure is similar to that of the traditional division. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's approved concept lists functions that the UEx can accomplish with the traditional staff structure, but these tasks may not account for the complexity of joint campaign planning. Therefore, with the UEx staff structure and functions identified, it is necessary to compare the approved functions with the UEx campaign planning challenges.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### ANALYSIS

The analysis compares the UEx campaign planning challenges from Chapter Two with the UEx capabilities from Chapter Three. This comparison identifies capability gaps between what is required to plan campaigns and what the UEx is capable of effectively achieving. The analysis then transitions to explore the potential areas for organizational change in order to increase the effectiveness of the UEx's planning capabilities. First, the analysis explores the idea of an organizational realignment of the UEx staff structure from a general staff to a functional staff model. Second, the analysis explores the value of the UEx creating a standing Joint Planning Group with a permanent core of planners to provide an organizational foundation for campaign planning.

The analysis begins with reviewing the UEx campaign planning challenges from Chapter Two. These challenges are derived from the analysis of JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations* and the role of operational art in campaign planning. JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations* states there are fourteen essential fundamentals of campaign planning. Nine of these fundamentals are not included in the UEx campaign planning challenges. These nine fundamentals division staffs already accomplish because they are organized, trained, and manned with the appropriate expertise and doctrine. The accomplishment of these fundamentals is similar to the outputs of the Military Decision Making Process.<sup>34</sup> The remaining five UEx campaign planning challenges are joint in nature and are accomplished by the various joint boards, centers, and cells. The discussion of operational art reinforces the requirement that all staffs should be organized to provide the commander with the necessary information he needs to conduct campaign planning.

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<sup>34</sup> See discussion in Chapter 3, p.13.

The analysis continues with reviewing the UEx functions from the *Objective Force, Unit of Employment Concept*. These functions are what the UEx should be capable of accomplishing with its organizational staff structure in Figure 5.

## Requirements versus Capabilities

The analysis compares the UEx campaign planning challenges listed in Table 4 with the UEx functions listed in Table 5.

Table 4. UEx Campaign Planning Challenges

Translate strategic guidance into operational direction for subordinate and supporting commanders.
Provide concepts of operations and sustainment for accomplishing strategic and operational objectives.
Synchronize and integrate air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, in combination with interagency and multinational forces, to achieve unit of effort.
Sequence a series of related major joint operations in time, space, and purpose throughout the operational area.
Clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination and potential post-hostilities activities.

Table 5. UEx Functions

The UE assigns missions and operating areas to subordinate units and defines timelines for their operations.
The UE directs simultaneous, integrated battles that comprise major operations, leading to rapid achievement of operational and/or campaign objectives.
The UE allocates subordinate fires/effects, aviation, ISR, maneuver support, and maneuver sustainment forces to weight the current battle and posture for future operations.
The UE applies mission-tailored forces to shield engaged forces from enemy capabilities, isolates the battle space where required with fires and/or blocking forces, and prevents the enemy from reinforcing or resynchronization.
The UE is primarily responsible for providing ground based elements to the joint counter-precision campaign.
The UE builds and maintains combat power and sustains the campaign.
The UE functions as the primary ISR integrator for Army forces.

Source: *Objective Force, Unit of Employment Concept*, 24.

The comparison of the UEx campaign planning challenges with the UEx functions does not eliminate any of the five remaining challenges the UEx should be able to perform to plan

campaigns. The UEx functions do not eliminate any campaign planning challenges because the UEx is not organized or resourced to effectively accomplish these joint requirements.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, there are five UEx campaign planning challenges in Table 4 that the UEx is not optimally organized or resourced to achieve.

The first UEx planning challenge is the ability to translate strategic guidance into operational direction for subordinate and supporting commanders. The UEx does not have the structure, training, experience, or resources to operate at this level of war. The staff routinely does not operate at this level of war and may be challenged to provide the critical linkage between strategy, operations, and tactics. The critical linkage is necessary to effectively transition to developing a concept of operations that achieves the strategic and operational objectives while providing direction to subordinate units.

The second UEx campaign planning challenge is to provide concepts of operations and sustainment for accomplishing strategic and operational objectives. This is a challenge because the concepts of operations for logistics and sustainment at the operational level are joint. The UEx staff does not have the joint expertise or membership organic to its staff organization. Without this joint expertise, the challenge increases to develop a concept of sustainment operations to support a Joint Task Force Headquarters conducting a campaign.

The third UEx campaign planning challenge is the synchronization and integration of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, in combination with interagency and multinational forces, to achieve unity of effort. The UEx is not resourced with the personnel, organizational structure, or equipment to *synchronize* all of the elements of this UEx campaign planning requirement. As an example, the UEx does not have the organizational structure or equipment to

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<sup>35</sup> The study is not saying the UEx could not form an ad hoc organization and accomplish all the fundamentals or develop a campaign plan. The study is demonstrating what the best organization is to accomplish those fundamentals, not how to make it work with the organization given to the UEx. The study is going to recommend improvements to the organizational structure in order to conduct campaign planning more effectively.

command and control air, space, and sea forces throughout the joint operational area.

Additionally, the UEx does not have the internal joint organization, personnel, and structure to integrate with interagency or multinational forces.

The fourth UEx campaign planning challenge is to sequence a series of related major joint operations in time, space, and purpose throughout the operational area. The staff structure of the UEx does not enable it to conduct the numerous joint boards and cells that have to be organized and run when the UEx is a Joint Task Force Headquarters and conducting joint operations. Furthermore, the staff structure of the UEx is Army centric and is organized along the traditional general staff model. The supported Regional Combatant Commander the UEx is working for is aligned functionally. Therefore, there is a connectivity misalignment between the traditional general staff and the functional staff.

The fifth UEx campaign planning challenge is to clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination and potential post-hostilities activities. The UEx is challenged to clearly defining what constitutes success, including conflict termination and potential post-hostilities activities. This problem is similar to the first two screening criteria, the UEx staff does not have the structure, training, experience, or resources to determine the criteria that constitute success or conflict termination.

A final consideration for campaign planning is a staff organization that provides the commander with necessary information he needs to conduct campaigns at the operational level of war. The UEx staff structure is not joint. Therefore, it may have challenges in providing the commander with the joint analysis and information he needs to operate as a Joint Task Force Headquarters at the operational level. The UEx staff is a general staff and not organized along functional lines that provide the necessary staff functions, joint boards, centers and cells to provide the commander the best possible analysis.

## Organizational Staff Realignment

An essential task of a headquarters, at any level, is the requirement to be able to command and control the forces assigned. The UEx has command and control challenges when assigned as a Joint Task Force Headquarters. To begin with, “the most demanding challenge is the fact that no adequate baseline exists, i.e., there is no standard Joint Task Force command and control organization or set of capabilities for use as a design objective.”<sup>36</sup> There is the possibility of over extending the capabilities of the UEx staff as it attempts to provide operational command and control as a Joint Task Force Headquarters.

In the future every headquarters must be joint force capable. As the UExs develop, they must be able to integrate their capabilities with the requirements for other joint headquarters. According to the *Objective Force, Unit of Employment Concept*, the minimum requirements are: joint communications, joint intelligence support element, joint search and rescue C2, joint targeting coordination, joint fires element, civil military operations center, joint facilities board, joint public affair/joint information bureau, and liaison to coalition, multinational, interagency, and non-governmental entities.<sup>37</sup> One of the ways the UEy is planning on being able to accomplish all of these tasks is through a staff structure that is organized functionally. It is logical if the UEy is going to be organized functionally because it may form the nucleus of a Joint Task Force Headquarters, the UEx should also functionally organize for the same reason.

One of the command and control tasks the UEx should be able to accomplish is the ability for staffs to communicate and integrate. Staffs must be able to communicate between echelons. This creates potential for inefficiency when one staff is arranged functionally (Operational ISR, Maneuver/Tactical Movement, Fires and Effects, Protection, Sustainment, and C2) and the other staff is arranged traditionally (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, G-6, and G-7 etc). The

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<sup>36</sup> *Objective Force, Unit of Employment Concept*, 55.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 59.

organizational misalignment between a functional and traditional staff may lead to confusion, increased time required for planning and conducting operations, and desynchronization.

One possible solution is restructuring the UEx staff organization from a general staff to a functional staff. The structure should be similar to the UEy in order to facilitate command and control when conducting operations as a subordinate headquarters. By organizing the UEx staff along the functional model, when it is required to serve as a Joint Task Force Headquarters, it does not have to make the transition from a general staff to a functional staff.

## **Advantages and Disadvantages**

An advantage of functional alignment for the UEx is the staff's ability to transition more effectively into the various joint boards, centers, and cells it is responsible for organizing and running.<sup>38</sup> These ten joint boards, centers, and cells all contribute to campaign planning accomplishment of all the UEx campaign planning challenges in Table 4.

The Logistics Coordination Board and the Joint Planning Group are two examples that demonstrate how the joint boards, centers, and cells contribute to accomplish the UEx campaign planning challenges. The Logistics Coordination Board is primarily responsible for the second UEx campaign planning criteria, providing concepts of operations and sustainment for accomplishing strategic and operational objectives. The *Standard Operating Procedure & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters* describe the primary functions of the Logistics Coordination Board. These functions are: to facilitate logistics support to the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and Joint Task Force by supporting, synchronizing, and coordinating the efforts of all logistic organizations; to enhance situational

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<sup>38</sup> United States Joint Forces Command, *Standard Operating Procedures & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters*, Annex F. These ten cells are the: Joint Information Superiority Cell (JISC); Joint Collection Management Cell (JCMC); Joint Coordination Board (JCB); Joint Coordination Board Working Group (JCB W/G); Joint Fires Element Working Group (JFE W/G); Time Sensitive Targets (TST) cell; Logistics Coordination Board (LCB); Blue/Red Cell; Joint Planning Group (JPG); and the Joint Knowledge Management Center (JKMC).

awareness to ensure responsive support and mission accomplishment; to ensure synchronization of logistics support in operational and tactical execution by providing a daily and/or on-call logistics board; and to integrate logistics considerations into strategic and operational planning activities.<sup>39</sup> The LCB has the training, organization, resources, and joint expertise necessary to accomplish this UEx campaign planning challenge.


The disadvantage of the UEx staff organizing functionally is that it places the burden of overcoming the organizational misalignment between functional and general staffs on the Units of Action. At some command level, there is going to be a staff organizational misalignment. Since, tactical operations occur at the Unit of Action level, these staffs should not be required to interface with a higher level headquarters that is not in the same organizational configuration. This challenge needs further analysis, but for a Unit of Action/Brigade Combat Team based force operating with a modularity concept, it may be better to place the burden of the organizational misalignment between the functional and general staff at the UEx level. Therefore, there may be benefit of leaving the UEx as a general staff organization.

## **The Joint Planning Group**

The Joint Planning Group can accomplish the remaining UEx campaign planning challenges. The Joint Planning Group at the Joint Task Force Headquarters becomes the staff cell responsible for developing subordinate campaign and major operations plans. This integrated planning cell forms the core group of planners with the expertise necessary to synchronize and integrate complex plans to achieve operational objectives within the development of campaign plans. To produce campaign plans and achieve the remaining UEx campaign planning challenges the Joint Planning Group uses the planning process in Figure 6.

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<sup>39</sup> *Standard Operating Procedure & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters*, F-16.



**Figure 6. Joint Planning Group Planning Process**

Source: *Standard Operating Procedure & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters*, E-12.

## Advantages and Disadvantages

The advantage of a Joint Planning Group is it accomplishes the remaining campaign planning challenges. Once the Joint Planning Group begins the planning process in Figure 6, either deliberate or crisis action planning, they accomplish the first campaign planning challenge to translate strategic guidance into operational direction for subordinate and supporting commanders. The Joint Planning Group accomplishes this task because it has the structure, training, and resources to operate at this level of war. The Joint Planning Group core staff routinely operates at this level of war and can provide the critical linkage between strategy,



operations, and tactics. Since the Joint Planning Group can provide the critical linkage, they can transition effectively to developing a concept of operations that achieves the strategic and operational objectives while providing direction to subordinate units.

The next campaign planning challenge is to synchronize and integrate air, land, sea, space and special operations forces, in combination with interagency and multinational forces, to achieve unity of effort. The Joint Planning Group has the personnel, organizational structure, and equipment to synchronize the elements of this UEx campaign planning challenge. As an example, the Joint Planning Group has the organizational structure and doctrine to develop concepts of operations which command and control air, space, and sea forces throughout the joint operational area. The Joint Planning Group has the internal joint organization, personnel, and structure to integrate with interagency or multinational forces.

The next campaign planning challenge is to sequence a series of related major joint operations in time, space, and purpose throughout the operational area. The Joint Planning Group accomplishes this task with the analysis and outputs from its planning process in Figure 6. The Joint Planning Group structure enables it to be the driving force behind the numerous joint boards and cells that should be organized and run when the UEx is a Joint Task Force Headquarters. Finally, the Joint Planning Group is joint and these joint personnel have the expertise to assist in the sequencing of joint operations in time, space, and purpose.

The remaining UEx campaign planning challenge is the ability to clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination and potential post-hostilities activities. While this requirement is challenging to all staffs, joint doctrine states that “other functions the Joint Planning Group may perform are the planning for termination and the planning for transition of the Joint Task Force to another military force, United Nations, regional organization, or civilian

organization.”<sup>40</sup> The Joint Planning Group has the charter in doctrine to develop the recommendations to address this last campaign planning requirement.

The disadvantage of the Joint Planning Group is the UEx does not have organic to its headquarters the joint personnel necessary to form a Joint Planning Group. Where do the non-U.S. Army members of the standing Joint Planning Group come from? The Joint Planning Group is a joint organization and should have joint representation. The joint representatives to the Joint Planning Group can come from three places, the Regional Combatant Commander, the new Standing Joint Force Headquarters, or the UEx. The *Objective Force, Unit of Employment Concept* envisions the joint representatives, or “plugs” coming from either the Regional Combatant Commander or the Standing Joint Force Headquarters.<sup>41</sup> However, the staff organization of the UEx is not configured to receive the augmentation. The other solution is the Joint Planning Group’s joint representation can permanently exist within the UEx. However, none of the UEx concepts consider this solution. Since the UEx may be a Joint Task Force Headquarters, there is a need for its staff to have joint representation.

## Summary

This chapter analyzes the requirements to conduct joint operational campaign planning with the structure and capabilities of the UEx. Comparison of the UEx campaign planning challenges with the UEx capabilities and functions identifies five capability gaps between the UEx campaign planning challenges and the UEx’s capabilities. These five gaps are the result of the UEx staffs not having the personnel and organizational structure to operate as a Joint Task Force Headquarters. Further complicating the challenge of these shortfalls is the staff organizational misalignment between the Regional Combatant Commander, UEx, and UEx. The

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., IX 13.

<sup>41</sup> Department of the Army, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-90 O&O, *Objective Force, Unit of Employment Concept*, (Fort Monroe, Virginia, 2003), 55.

Regional Combatant commander and UEy are organized along a functional staff model while the UEx is organized along the general staff model. There is a staff interface challenge when a higher level staff is organized along different lines than the subordinate staffs. The question becomes how to best overcome these challenges and what recommendations for change in the UEx staff structure are necessary to make it more effective in planning operational campaigns.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### **CONCLUSION and RECOMMENDATION**

What capabilities are required for the Unit of Employment, X (UEX) to plan joint operational level campaigns and operations as a Joint Task Force Headquarters? The UEX staff structure does not appear optimally organized or resourced to be effective in planning operational level campaigns as a Joint Task Force Headquarters. There are two possible solutions in order for the UEX to be capable of acting as a Joint Task Force Headquarters and conducting subordinate campaign planning. The first solution is the organizational realignment of the UEX staff structure from a general staff to a functional staff model. The second solution is the creation of a standing Joint Planning Group with a permanent core of planners to provide an organizational foundation for campaign planning.

#### **Conclusion**

The study examines the fundamentals of campaign planning from joint doctrine in order to establish UEX campaign planning challenges. Of these fourteen fundamentals in joint doctrine, nine are not campaign planning challenges for the UEX. The UEX has the organization, training, and doctrine to accomplish these fundamentals. Their accomplishment is similar to the outputs of the Military Decision Making Process that Army division and corps staffs should be capable of performing. Since division and corps staffs use the Military Decision Making Process as the doctrinal standard for planning operations, the study does not consider these nine fundamentals as challenges for the UEX to plan campaigns. The observation that staffs at the division and corps level train the Military Decision Making Process does not guarantee the UEX can accomplish these fundamentals, but the UEX has a good start on achieving them.

The biggest challenge for the UEX is in accomplishing the remaining five fundamentals in Table 4. These five fundamentals are orders of magnitude higher than what the UEX staffs routinely accomplish. These fundamentals are inherently joint in nature and are usually

accomplished in staffs whose organization facilitates the creation of joint boards, centers, and cells.

The current UEx staff organization is not optimally organized or resourced to facilitate the creation of these joint boards, centers, and cells in order to accomplish the remaining five campaign planning challenges. There are two possible solutions in order for the UEx to be more effective in conducting subordinate campaign planning. The first solution is the organizational realignment of the UEx staff structure from a general staff to a functional staff model. The second solution is the creation of a standing Joint Planning Group with a permanent core of planners to provide an organizational foundation for campaign planning.

The first option, the organizational realignment from a general staff to a functional staff, facilitates the UEx's transition into the various joint boards, centers, and cells it is responsible for organizing and running as a Joint Task Force Headquarters. These ten joint boards, centers, and cells contribute to a Joint Task Force Headquarters achieving the fourteen campaign planning fundamentals. However, the UEx's organizational realignment from a general staff to a functional staff has some possible limitations.

The UEx organizing functionally places the burden of overcoming the organizational misalignment between functional and general staffs on the Units of Action. At some command level, there is going to be a staff organizational misalignment. Since, tactical operations occur at the Unit of Action level, these staffs should not be required to interface with a higher level headquarters that is not in the same organizational configuration. This challenge needs further analysis, but for a Unit of Action/Brigade Combat Team based force operating with a modularity concept, it may be better to place the burden of the organizational misalignment between the functional and general staff at the UEx level. Therefore, there may be benefit of leaving the UEx as a general staff organization.

As a result, the second option, the creation of a Joint Planning Group, may be the most feasible solution. Of the ten joint boards, centers, and cells, the most important one for campaign

planning is the Joint Planning Group. The Joint Planning Group at the Joint Task Force Headquarters is the staff cell responsible for developing subordinate campaign and major operations plans. This integrated planning cell forms the core group of planners with the expertise necessary to synchronize and integrate complex plans to achieve operational objectives within the development of campaign plans.

The creation of a standing Joint Planning Group facilitates the long term assignment of personnel to the Joint Planning Group and the creation of a permanent core of planners. Since the UEx is Joint Task Force Headquarters capable it should assign personnel to a standing Joint Planning Group in order to provide for long term continuity of focus and consistency of procedure. If the UEx has a standing Joint Planning Group, it does not have to recreate staff procedures and relationships every time the UEx is activated as a Joint Task Force Headquarters. The Joint Planning Group should also have a small core of staff personnel that have the expertise to plan operations. This core is also the basis for expanding the Joint Planning Group, upon Joint Task Force Headquarters activation, to its full membership. The core Joint Planning Group can also immediately begin the process of campaign planning until the time the Standing Joint Force Headquarters augmentation package arrives

## **Recommendation**

The first option, the organizational realignment from a general staff to a functional staff, facilitates the UEx's transition into the various joint boards, centers, and cells it is responsible for organizing and running as a Joint Task Force Headquarters. However, this places the burden of overcoming functional and general staff misalignment on the Units of Action. This burden should remain at the UEx level. As a result, the creation of a Joint Planning Group is the most feasible solution. The UEx should make the Joint Planning Group a permanent organization within its headquarters. Of the ten joint boards, centers, and cells the most important one for campaign planning is the Joint Planning Group. The UEx is capable of planning operational

campaign plans with the creation of a standing Joint Planning Group consisting of a permanent joint group of core planners to provide an organization foundation for campaign planning.

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